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The writings of Guattari and Latour are best described as interventions, which mobilize the 
politics at stake in the respective economies of their work. At the same time, they enact a 
provisional, open, late state of the transdisciplinary problematic, critically deconstructing and 
destroying the whole field of disciplinary and interdisciplinary knowledges. They involve a 
common, paradoxical and polemical 'political epistemology' (Latour, 2005: 254) that 
identifies the redefinition of politics at stake in this uncertain 'epistemology' with an 
ontological pragmatics — or a pragmatic ontology – which submits epistemology to an 
absolute de-definition, forced upon it by the new ecological emergencies: environmental, 
social and mental ecology, as Guattari insists.  
 I propose here to redesign these two bodies of work as radical developers of a 
transdisciplinarity that imposes a definitive bifurcation as the historical and ontological truth 
of its final construction. This bifurcation inevitably becomes multiple because, following the 
rediscovery and reinvention of pragmatics (Guattari-Deleuze) and pragmaticism (Latour), it 
ends up breaking through that history which, since the 1960s, had drawn upon structuralism 
and poststructuralism in order to question disciplinary definitions of the sciences and 
humanities. It affirms as its raison d'être ‘the necessity to return to Pragmatics’, to experiment 
with the new transdisciplinary significance of the processual constructions liberated by the 
‘magic formula PLURALISM = MONISM': i.e. the hard ontological core or milieu of A 
Thousand Plateaus and its rhizomatic (that is, anti-structuralist) motto (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2004b: 23). And it does so, against any of the disciplinary ordinations maintained by the 
dualisms of subject/object, mind/matter, nature/society, etc..  
 It could be objected to this anti-dualistic statement that the passage in which the 
‘magic formula PLURALISM = MONISM' is proposed speaks of proceeding 'via all the 
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dualisms that are the enemy, an entirely necessary enemy, the furniture we are forever 
rearranging’. Yet the context clearly shows that this sentence involves nothing other than the 
strategic presentation of the rhizome and of its 'transformational multiplicities' in contrast to a 
structure, 'which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary relations between the 
points and biunivocal relationships between the positions'
 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 23, 
emphasis added). Or, in Latour’s words (here adopting a kind of Guattarian parlance): 'in 
structuralism nothing is really transformed, it is simply combined' (Latour, 2005: 153). And 
the antagonism is so asymmetrical, from the perspective of 'an immanent process' that 
overturns the very idea of model and abstract modeling — since 'it is perpetually in 
construction or collapsing', and the process is 'perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and 
starting again' — that 'there is not a new or different dualism' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 
23). Rather, there is a radical division mobilising the ontological problem from which 
interdisciplinarity is equally and differently excluded as a mere institutional resolution of 
epistemological questions; and from which transdisciplinarity gets its affirmative sense and 
critical empowerment with regard to the both sciences and philosophy, in the uncommon 
monism of a social ontology – 'not a social epistemology', Latour emphasizes (Latour, 2007: 
14). 
 To explore the pragmatic turn that spurs the equation PLURALISM = MONISM, and the 
zone of resonance where Guattari and Latour meet within and beyond Deleuzian philosophy, 
in the recoding of ‘ANT’ (Actor-Network Theory) as ‘ARO’ (Actant-Rhizome Ontology' 
(Latour 1999: 19), we need first to retrace the history of this division. 
 
Structuralism re-cognized 
The transdisciplinary research program of structuralism was based on the structural 
functionalism of linguistics and developed in a combinatory system of relations mobilizing 
the scientific problematization of the ‘human sciences’ against the transcendental legitimacy 
and theoretical primacy of philosophy. It is this radical challenge to philosophy that makes 
Ricœur (during the famous 1963 debate with Lévi-Strauss organized by Esprit) ironically 
render explicit what structures are not, in a neither/nor that condemns any possible mediation, 
dilemma or balancing between a 'subjective' form and/or an 'objective' content: structures as 
transcendental apparatus and structures as objectivities located in the real in itself (Ricoeur, 
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1963).
1
 It is not so much that the ‘theme’ of the ‘end of philosophy’ was translated into the 
linguistic opening and operational closure of structural space, but rather that the unrivalled 
ontological status of the structure opposes to philosophy its epistemological revolution from 
the perspective of a transdisciplinary reconfiguration of the sciences de l’homme and within a 
structural-linguistic paradigm that breaks with representation – i.e. with any representative 
content related to forms of consciousness of the subject, ‘within the meaning bequeathed by 
philosophy’ (Lacan, 2001b: 222).2 This formally or symbolically redefines the very concept of 
science to include a thoroughly recast anthropology, psychoanalysis and ‘class struggle in 
theory’: Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Althusser.3 If this sequence brought together linguistics and 
mathematics as the centre and major point of tension of the structural paradigm, it must be 
emphasized that its transdisciplinary identity/alterity depends on a prior condition. This prior 
condition is that of a flat ontology of the sign where the differential and purely 
relational/positional character of the sign undoes the association of ontology with metaphysics 
(‘une ontologie sans métaphysique’, Foucault wrote – Foucault, 2002: 370) to identify it with 
the symbolic order itself: 'a new type of ontology' (Milner, 2002: 38), an ontology of the 
symbolic order that raises the classical modern problem of the relation between being and 
subjectivity, and conceives of subjectivity itself as the split effect of a non-referential logic of 
the signifier, which ‘vectorizes’ onto-topologically the transdisciplinary plane of consistency 
of structuralism.  
This provides the full logic of sense of Deleuze’s 1967 re-presentation of structuralism, 
‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?’, ascribing its origin to linguistics and erecting the 
Symbolic as its ‘First Criterion’, the better to re-enact the Lacanian Empty Square (neither an 
image, nor a concept: this is Deleuze’s Sixth and last nominal criterion) as the Differentiator 
of Difference itself and the ‘Problematizer’ of the ‘complete determination of singular points 
that constitute a space corresponding to these elements’ (Deleuze 2004: 177). However, the 
most interesting thing about this infamous article by Deleuze is that it over- and undetermines 
                                                 
1
 Telescoping the two in an ‘objective transcendental field’, Michel Serres will later define a structuralist 
philosophy based on a Leibnizian mathematical paradigm, de facto excluding the leading function of linguistics 
for the constitution of this structural field. See Michel Serres, 2015, above. 
2
 It is this exclusion that will allow the affirmation: 'the experience of the unconscious taken at the level where I 
install it, can't be distinguished from the physical experience. It is also external to the subject, within its 
traditional [philosophical] meaning' (Lacan 2001b: 222). 
3
 Following Lacan, in the same text: 'Tout ceci s'énonce en une suite scientifique à partir du moment où il y a une 
science du langage aussi fondée et aussi sûre que la physique, ce qui est le cas au point où en la linguistique — 
c'est le nom de cette science — d'être considéré partout maintenant pour ce qui est du champ humain comme une 
science pilote' (Lacan 2001b: p. 223). The next page integrates the 'foundation of Marxist history' into this new 
scientific configuration and its psychoanalytic 'supplement'. But this sequence is (and had to be) preceded by the 
reframing of the question: 'Is psychoanalysis a science?' towards 'What would a science that includes 
psychoanalysis have to be like?' (Lacan, 2001a: 187). 
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the structuralist archaeology of knowledge put forward by Foucault in his concluding remarks 
about the ‘human sciences’ in 1966's The Order of Things. Briefly stated, since Étienne 
Balibar largely carries out this work in his article in this volume (Balibar, 2015: ??–??): it is 
well known that the final chapter of The Order of Things proposes a substantial variation of 
the first transdisciplinary unification operated by an episteme through invariants that govern 
formal correspondences and conceptual analogies between the disciplines articulated in a 
general type of rationality: a classically modern transdisciplinary rationality, or paradigm. In 
fact, Foucault argues in favour of a totally new transdisciplinary status for psychoanalysis and 
ethnology: ‘they span the entire domain of [human] sciences, […] they animate its whole 
surface, spread their concepts throughout it, and are able to propound their methods of 
decipherment and their interpretations everywhere’ (Foucault, 2002: 413). It is through their 
structuralist recasting that they can work as ‘counter-sciences’, unmaking ‘that very man who 
is creating and re-creating his positivity in the human sciences’ while ‘they intersect at right 
angles; for the chain of the signifier by which the unique experience of the individual is 
constituted is perpendicular to the formal system on the basis of which the significations of 
culture are constituted’ (Foucault, 2002: 414–5).  
 A transdisciplinary model of structural ordination here submits the subject to its own 
systematicity. It is worth quoting what follows since it formulates exactly what Deleuze tries 
to problematize and render differential in his 1967 article (Deleuze quotes this passage from 
Foucault (Deleuze, 2004: 189), before producing an alternative ‘anti-model’ that can only 
come after structuralism — and after Guattari’s critique of structuralism). It reads:  
At any given instant, the structure proper to individual experience finds a certain 
number of possible choices (and of excluded possibilities) in the system of society; 
inversely, at each of their points of choice the social structures encounter a certain 
number of possible individuals (and others who are not) — just as the linear structure 
of language always produces a possible choice between several words or several 
phonemes at any given moment (but excludes all other). (Foucault, 2002: 415)  
 
If, to quote Balibar, ‘linguistics is the “counter-science” par excellence’ (Balibar, 2015: ??), 
and already incorporates the transdisciplinary paradigm identified with structuralism, it is 
because it is in linguistics that ‘the theme of a pure theory of language’ emerges and provides 
‘the ethnology and the psychoanalysis thus conceived with their formal model’ (Foucault, 
2002: 414). It is this new scientific order of positivity determined by the emergence of the 
structure (as an invariant relation of elements within an ensemble of elements) that, after 
reopening its relations to mathematics and ‘traversing the whole space of human sciences, 
would encounter the question of finitude’, desubjectivated and dishistoricized in the very 
 5 
‘being of language’ (‘l’être du langage’) as ontologically explored in literature (Foucault, 
2002: 415–8). But is it not exactly this double modernist ‘solution’ that Deleuze 
diplomatically refuses when he reopens the enquiry on structuralism at the very end of his 
article, under the heading ‘Final Criteria: From the Subject to Practice’? These will be 
immediately considered as ‘the most obscure — the criteria of the future’ (Deleuze, 2004: 
192). 
 As we know, Deleuze dramatizes a mysterious ‘structuralist hero: neither God nor man, 
neither personal nor universal… without an identity, made of non-personal individuations and 
pre-individual singularities’ (Deleuze, 2004: 191), a hero whose emergence is located 
between two quotations from The Order of Things. The first one is extracted from the last 
Nietzschean-inspired page of chapter 9, ‘Man and his Doubles’. It states: 
It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void left by man’s 
disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency [a lack: un manque – EA]; it 
does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled in. It is nothing more and nothing less 
than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think. (Foucault, 
2002: 373, quoted in Deleuze, 2004, 190). 
 
But in Deleuze’s text, this ‘void’ strictly refers to the Lacanian paradox of the empty square, 
disengaged from any negativity to affirm the ‘positive being of the “problematic”, the 
objective being of a problem and of a question; it is (nothing else than) the onto-topological 
problem of the subject since ‘the subject is precisely the agency [instance] which follows the 
empty place: as Lacan says, it is less subject than subjected [assujetti] — subjected to the 
empty square, subjected to the phallus and its displacements.’ (Deleuze, 2004: 189–90) 
Nevertheless, against Lacan's active void, negating the very existence of a 'virtual',
4
 by 
definition irreducible to a formal language determining the subject,
5
 this subject will be 
immediately translated — or better, transduced — into the Deleuzian nomad subject, de-
defined in terms of ‘non-personal individuations and pre-individual singularities’ (Deleuze, 
2004: 191). It becomes thus, par la bande (a Bergsonian 'band'!), the philosophical ‘truth’ of 
the structuralist break-up qua this ‘new transcendental philosophy’ from which structuralism 
would  then be inseparable. But the most interesting thing is the way in which the possible 
‘accidents’ of this nomad subject (the disappearance of the ‘signifier’ or the fading away of 
the ‘signified’: the two pathological aspects of psychosis) are brought back to the question of 
                                                 
4
 In Jean-Claude Milner's terms: 'il n'y a pas de virtuel', or 'il n'y a de virtuel qu'imaginaire' (Milner, 2002: 159). 
For Deleuze, the virtual is the horizon of the 'Fourth Criterion: The Differenciator, Differenciation' (Deleuze, 
2004: 178-82). 
5
 Following the cardinal affirmation of the ‘Séminaire sur 'La Lettre volée' that opens Lacan’s Écrits (Lacan, 
1966: 42). 
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their immanent determinations in the structures and to the problem of their mutations. This, 
finally, relates to the problem of praxis, to the ‘resistant and creative force’ of a (structuralist) 
hero, ‘the break-up [éclatement] of a structure affected by excess or deficiency’, with the 
opposition of ‘his own ideal events’ to ‘the ideal events we have just described’ — as ‘strictly 
determined [my emphasis – EA] by the play of [the] structural adventures and the 
contradictions resulting from it’ (Deleuze, 2004: 191). Invoking a possible radical rewriting of 
the Lacanian analysand's 'subjective conversion' (Lacan, 1966: 43), this passage is footnoted 
with a second quotation from Foucault concerning the onset of a structural mutation at the 
beginning of the 19
th
 century (the ‘Age of History’): ‘a radical event that is distributed across 
the entire visible surface of the knowledge, and whose signs, shocks and effects it is possible 
to follow step by step’, and which can be thus ‘analysed’ but not ‘explained’ (Foucault, 2002: 
236, quoted in Deleuze, 2004: 308, n.64).
6
   
In Deleuze, the radical event has changed place and subject to become the heroic ‘point 
of permanent revolution’, still referred to a structuralist ‘practice’, be it ‘therapeutic or 
political’, but clearly announcing, as it traces out this unique path translating structuralism 
into post-structuralism, a subjective break with an all-too-complete structural determination 
and with the effects of other logical structures of a twofold epistemological 
transdisciplinarity, maintaining and perhaps accentuating its closure in the ‘symbolic’ passage 
from classical modern knowledge to contemporary thought. Interestingly, the Foucaldian 
passage from a still unexplained 'transformable group' (ensemble transformable) referring, in 
Archaeology of Knowledge, to the historical a priori of positivities, to 'transformable 
singularities' is based upon a 'modality of relation to the self' which will result in a 
Hermeneutics of the Subject – an anti-Lacanian non-self-identical form.7 Its Deleuzean re-
presentation in terms of 'lines of subjectivation', escaping from the lines of sedimentation of  
established powers and constituted knowledges, gives it an immediate Guattarian output — 'a 
process, a production of subjectivity in a dispositive [dispositif]… a line of flight' (Deleuze, 
1989: 186–7) – superposing the 'crisis in Foucault's thought' from which it emerged onto 
Deleuze's own crossing of the line.   
 
Guattari: From machinic transversality to a new aesthetic paradigm  
                                                 
6
 In his Foreword to the English Edition, written in 1970 (i.e. after the publication of The Archaeology of 
Knowledge with its focus on the question of discontinuity, developed out of structuralism), Foucault admits that 
he has been 'incapable … of offering [a solution]' to this question of change (Foucault, 2002: xiii).    
7
 I am largely following here Knox Peden's reconstruction in Peden, 2012: 82-88. 
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Following Guattari, who in the 1960s was struggling with the very same question from within 
a Lacanism he reconfigured out of the 'structuralist impasse' (Guattari, 1972: 180; 1984a: 
182),
8
 it was as if structural transdisciplinarity had critically to become transversality, had to 
reopen the problem of ‘Causality, Subjectivity and History’ in its most theoretical and 
practical stakes from within the politically (re)charged question of transformation.
9
 The 
Deleuzian warning in Logic of Sense (1969) will certainly have been part of the crystallization 
of the agencement Deleuze-Guattari. It reads: ‘How are we to stay at the surface without 
staying on the shore?’ (Deleuze, 2001: 179). Guattari, for his part, had already stated that on 
this surface, 'Reality and history have become subject to an eternal symbolic order from 
which they are totally isolated and which essentially nullifies them. Subjectivity and the 
signifier have become interchangeable' (Guattari, 1984: 177), in the guise of the action of the 
structure (Miller, 2012).
10
  
  From this perspective, it is 1968 as the driver of a historical and causal break that ends 
structuralism. Breaking through an Anti-Œdipus more generational than ethical, 1968 
liberates the non-identique à soi from the chain of the signifier (chaîne signifiante) and ushers 
in the time of the ‘rhizome’ as an anti-structuralist war machine that makes structure take 
flight according to a machinic apparatus that 'desymbolizes', or desutures its real-abstraction 
so as to animate it from the outside. But following Guattari,, this outside is nothing other than 
the machination of the subject qua 'anti-signifier' (Guattari, 2013c: 161). Or, to put it another 
way: it is by identifying the critique of the structure with an absolute deterritorialization and 
socialization of the (concept of) subject that ‘transformation’ will confront its real ontological 
dimension, in a single but mixed semiotic plane of immanence. ‘Signs work flush to the real’ 
(les signes travaillent à même le réel – Guattari, 1977: 250) is the leitmotiv of the Guattarian 
scaffoldings and the key formula in Molecular Revolution's 1977 toolbox. This animates the 
rhizome with the principles of connexion and heterogeneity, performing ‘transformational 
multiplicities’ in such a way that enunciation — the enunciation at work in the transformation 
                                                 
8
 The key to this attempt is a 'machinic interpretation of Lacan's a'. On this point, see Félix Guattari, 2006: 152–
7, for the Hjelmslevian semiotics implied in the Guattarian operation and the way it gives birth to a 'collective 
assemblage of the enunciations' (wrongly translated on p. 156 as 'collective assemblage of enunciation') in the 
analytical process.  
9
 On transversality, see Andrew Goffey introduction to Guattari's text in this issue (??-??). It is important to note 
that this transversal movement is not without relations to Foucault's own trajectory, from The Order of Things to 
Discipline and Punish (1975).     
10
 In ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?’, Deleuze largely founded his own re-presentation of an inflated 
Lacanian structuralism on Miller’s article (quoted by Deleuze). For Guattari, there is no doubt that it was the 
emergence of the Jacques-Alain Miller 'group' as an influential 'cartel' at the École Freudienne de Paris, founded 
by Lacan in 1964, that overdetermined his violent anti-structuralism. Jacques-Alain Miller's article had been 
written and distributed in 1964 under these Lacanian auspices (see the 'Avertissement' introducing ‘Action de la 
structure’), to which Guattari's ‘Causality, Subjectivity and History’ reacts.     
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of the subject into a 'collective agent of enunciation' – escapes from the structuralist 
temptation.
11
 Enunciation means semiotization, making ‘the collective assemblages of 
enunciation function directly within [concrete and abstract] machinic assemblages’, making it 
‘impossible to make a radical break between regimes of signs and their objects’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004b: 7–8).  ‘Getting out of language’  (Sortir de la langue)12 through a radical 
critique of linguistics conducted on behalf of a pragmatic ontology of signs (projecting a 
‘diagrammatic’ Hjelmslev against structuralism ‘and its fondness for the signifier’),13 will 
occupy a full third of A Thousand Plateaus, and will mobilize, again and again, the 
schizoanalytic ‘meta-modelisations’. It is definitively the real ‘introduction’ into the rhizome 
and to a total de-epistemologization and re-ontologization, as the extreme transdisciplinary 
condition necessary to attain a politics of multiplicities that is totally oriented towards 
experimentation with the complexity of the real. The real is not the impossible, Guattari says 
somewhere, but the field of the possible, correlative to the deterritorialization of the sign. Or, 
more provocatively, in the mood of the sign's mad constructivism: if 'the genesis of 
enunciation is itself caught up in the movement of processual creation', ‘the process precedes 
the heterogenesis of being’ (Guattari, 1995: 107–8).  
This ‘schizo ontology’ or ‘onto-logic’, developing the logic of a ‘transversal ontology’ (all 
Guattari’s terms) will inevitably denounce Science (with a capital S) and the received 
disciplinary models of scientificity
14
. It reads as an anti-Althusserian motto: ‘We are no more 
familiar with scientificity than we are with ideology: all we know are assemblages’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004: 25). Equally, they will involve ‘the psyche, human societies, the living 
world, machinic species and, in the last analysis, the Cosmos itself’, in a Mecanosphere 
intertwined with the Biosphere. This is a very ANT or ARO catalogue, as is confirmed by 
Guattari's declared interest for the 'sociological school around Bruno Latour', because 'there is 
no pure conceptual scientific object that could be separated from its [social, economic, 
contextual] components' (Guattari, 2013a: 138). The conclusion is also strangely Latourian in 
its phrasing: ‘such a “transversalist” enlargement of enunciation should lead to the fall of the 
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 To my knowledge, the first occurence of this 'agent collectif d'énonciation' can be found in ‘Introduction à la 
psychothérapie institutionnelle’ (1962-1963), in Félix Guattari, Psychanalyse et transversalité (Guattari, 1972: 
47.) 
12
 After the introduction, this is the first heading of L'Inconscient machinique (Guattari, 1979: 21). This book 
should be read as standing in the same relation to A Thousand Plateaus as Guattari's Anti-Œdipus Papers does to  
Anti-Œdipus. 
13
 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Anti-Œdipus: ‘Far from being an overdetermination of structuralism and of 
its fondness for the signifier, Hjelmslev’s linguistics implies the concerted destruction of the signifier, and 
constitutes a decoded theory of language’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 262).  
14
 This is the leitmotiv of Guattari's 1992 text ‘From Transdisciplinarity to Transversality’ (1992), above ??–??: 
'balancing out the pole of the universal rationality of science seems indispensible' (??– ??). 
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“Ontological Iron Curtain” that the philosophical tradition erected between mind and matter’ 
(Guattari, 1995: 108).
15
 It will be understood that the insistence on ‘the machination 
producing the existent, the generative praxes of heterogeneity and complexity’ (Guattari, 
1995: 109), the very notion of a ‘non-human enunciation’ and the plane of machinic 
interfaces from which ‘Being crystallizes through an infinity of enunciative assemblages’ 
(Guattari, 1995: 58), calls into question all disciplinary boundaries, short-circuited now by the 
formula PROCESSUAL MONISM = PLURALISM OF ASSEMBLAGES.   
Do we not therefore also reach here the adisciplinary limit of transdisciplinarity, where 
‘disciplines’ are attacked qua the ‘control principle over the production of discourse’ 
highlighted by Foucault in the The Order of Discourse (Foucault, 1981: 61), and 
deconstructed at its highest level by Guattari as signifying the exclusion of ‘trans-semiotic 
and amodal enunciative compositions’ (Guattari, 1995: 104)? If the Guattarian formulation of 
a transfer from scientific paradigms to an ‘ethico-aesthetic paradigm’ (developed in 
Chaosmosis in a kind of meta-physics of the rhizome)
16
 is not the most convincing position on 
this question, Guattari nevertheless insists that the strengthening of the heterogeneity of 
components in a process of heterogenesis, supporting a new 'politics of science' upon what he 
calls an 'ecology of the virtual', depends on considering science in terms of the specificity of 
'its scientific assemblage, of its partial enunciators, of the scientific plane of reference, with 
introduction of systems of limits, of coordinates…’. It is after this passage, directly derived 
from the 'scientific' chapter of What is Philosophy? (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 117–133) 
that Guattari affirms: 'This is the condition that will allow us to position science in a non 
scientistic way' with regard to these 'praxical objects' (Guattari, 2013a: 138–9 [transl. 
modified]), conditioning a constructivist opening up of the fields of virtuality and new 
modalities of a computer-aided subjectivation.
17
  
We may read here a radical alternative to the 'expanded Galileism', linguistically extended 
to new objects ('un galiléisme de la langue' – Milner, 1995: 92–7)18 promoted by 
Althusserian-Lacanian structuralism. And we can see that Guattari's critical movement 
overlaps Foucault's 'Réponse au Cercle d'épistémologie' (i.e., to the Cahiers pour l'Analyse), 
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 The expression “Ontological Iron Curtain” comes from Pierre Lévy, who was himself an avid reader of 
Latour. 
16
 See the Guattarian reprise of the concept of rhizome in a typescript without title (IMEC GTR 12-24), recently 
published as ‘Rhizome and Tree’ in Félix Guattari, Qu’est-ce que l’écosophie ? (Guattari, 2013b: 535-45).   
17
 Cf. Guattari, 2008. This argument is summarised in the first chapter of Guattari, 1995, ‘On the Production of 
Subjectivity’. 
18
 Jean-Claude Milner's two 'Galilean' expressions articulate perfectly the scientific realm of the Cahiers pour 
l'Analyse, and its counter-trace in the Guattarian new aesthetic (or 'proto-aesthetic') paradigm, objecting against 
the indefinite paradigmatic extension of a scientific method reduced to its reduction of sensible qualities.     
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when the latter deconstructs the 'epistemological extrapolation' and the 'formalizing illusion' 
that imagines 'that science is established by an act of rupture and decision, that it frees itself at 
one stroke from the qualitative field and from all the murmurings of the imaginary by the 
violence… of a reason that founds itself by its own assertion' (Foucault, 2012: 331).  And yet, 
still in parallel with Foucault's 'regional analysis', we should also note the forced rearticulation 
of A Thousand transdisciplinary Plateaus with the redisciplinarization of What is Philosophy, 
which Guattari projects as a 'chaosmosis' taking over, ontologically and politically, from the 
socially expanded field of forces and trajectories from which disciplines constitute 
themselves. Ontologically, before and beyond the regional differences between 'activities', the 
superposition of the immanence of infinity and finitude onto the machinic point of negotiation 
between complexity and chaos, upstream, will let loose the 'Universes of references' into a 
'mutant creationism' promoting 'different enunciative assemblages, different semiotic 
recourses, an alterity grasped at the point of its emergence' (Guattari, 1995: 117). In their 
extreme meta-physical modalities (in the most difficult pages of Chaosmosis, in chapter 6, 
‘The New Aesthetic Paradigm), these ‘Universes of references’ will exceed the sectorization 
and binarization of values’ transcendent autonomized pole of reference, from the key 
heterogenetic position of a machinic transversality translated into the 'new aesthetic 
paradigm'. But the point is that this whole process, which necessarily associates the 'aesthetic 
machine' with technoscience's machinic creativity and the machinic dimensions of 
subjectivity, cannot really develop consistency politically, at the level of an 'ecology of 
practices' (to use Isabelle Stengers' locution in resonance with the Guattarian articulation 
between 'social experimentation and action-research'), without permanently addressing and 
confronting its institutionally stabilized modes of existences into disciplines, which are also, 
historically, the over-determined 'regional' configuration of the most speculative thought.
19
  
As we shall see, a similar kind of difficulty awaits Bruno Latour.  
 
Latour: From ‘actant-rhizome ontology’ to a new politics of institutional forms 
Let us return to the rhizome and to its pragmatic development in terms of an Actor-Network 
Theory self-critically re-presented, against its managerialist reduction to the multinational 
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 See Guattari 2015: ??, above. Let us not forget that the Guattarian 'machine' has strong historical and Marxist 
foundations. Cf. Guattari, 1969. This article initially intended for the journal of the École Freudienne (and 
refused by the latter) opened the collaboration with Deleuze. It proposes to substitute the order of the machine 
for the structuralist Differenciator, as expounded by Deleuze in Logic of Sense, 8th Series (which may be 
considered a reworking of ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?’). It is this whole process that Isabelle 
Stengers folds and retrojects into her affirmation that 'philosophy, science and art in What is Philosophy? do not 
speak, the truth of the risks of thought, except by the effect of a properly modernist misunderstanding, , because 
they are rather aspects of the three discourses stabilized by distinct traditions'. (Stengers, 1997b: 126, n 4.)  
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enterprise ANT, as ARO (Haro sur l’ANT – Death to ANT?!): Actant-Rhizome Ontology. In 
the introduction to a collective work published in 1999 under the heading Actor Network 
Theory and After, John Law makes sense of this equivalence, coming back ruthlessly to the 
‘two stories’ generating and articulating the Theory. Semiotics of materiality, translated into 
relational materiality is the name of the first one. ‘It takes the insight of semiotics, that of the 
relationality of entities, the notion that they are produced in relations, and applies this 
ruthlessly to all materials — and not simply to those that are linguistic.’ (Law, 1999: 4)20 But 
it is performatively that the 'inherent qualities' and ‘essentialist divisions’ have to be ‘thrown 
on the bonfire of dualisms’: since entities are not only located in the relations of which they 
are the effects (structural topology), they perform and ‘are performed in, by, and through 
these relations’. Performativity, Performance, Happening or Event (événement: a word used 
by Latour) is the second ‘story’ that translates the intentionally oxymoric 'Actor-Network' into 
the local problematizations of its onto-semiotic principle of heterogeneity. (Law, 1999: 4–5) 
 Bruno Latour, in the same book, starts his article by saying that ‘there are four things 
that do not work with ANT: the word actor, the word network, the word theory and the 
hyphen! Four nails in the coffin!’ (Latour, 1999: 15). The word network, the ‘double click’ 
information-system (the Evil Genius of 2012's An Inquiry into Modes of Existence) is 
caricatured as the ‘pet notion of all those who want to modernize modernization with the most 
frightening of the slogans: "Down with rigid institutions, long live flexible networks"’. This 
new capitalistic scenography is immediately opposed to the Deleuzo-Guattarian use of the 
term network, identified with a rhizome meaning a ‘series of transformations’ (Latour adds: 
‘translations, transductions’) which is not only opposed to the current Web-engineering of a 
transportation of information without deformation: it cannot ‘be captured by any of the 
traditional terms of social theory’. The conclusion reads: ‘I don’t think we should use it 
anymore, at least not to mean the type of transformations and translations we want to 
explore’. The rhizomatic motto means a pragmatist, processual and relational ontology that 
refuses the bifurcation into subject/object and any perspective of reconciliation (since it is a 
complete artefact), as well as any dualism of material/social, individual actor-
agency/structure, micro/macro, local/global… That is, it means ‘following circulations 
[rather] than… defining entities, essences or provinces’ (Latour, 1999: 20). A circulating 
molecular transdisplinarity is the key to this processual constructionism, which will ‘nail’ the 
two other terms nominally configuring ANT. It is a way to travel from one spot to the next, 
                                                 
20
 Bruno Latour has always insisted on the constitutive importance of semiotics for his trajectory. For an 
evolutionary analysis of its use through the concept of ‘enunciation’, see for example, Latour 2013b.  
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learning from the most heterogeneous actants and their world-building associative capacities; 
a method not for a theory, but for a research protocol empirically correlated with an 
irreductive ontology, proposing that actantiality is not what an ‘actor’ does but what provides 
human and non-human actants with their inter/actions, their assemblages in 
continuity/discontinuity among modes of action, and their ‘subjectivity’.  
 If Actor/Actant and Network/Worknet are two faces of the same process reflecting its 
movement beyond the great bifurcation Material/Social or Society/Nature, a fully 
deterritorialized subjectivity is ready to drift from the fold between the sociology of science’s 
laboratory (the new transdisciplinary discipline largely invented by ANT case-studies and 
located in Science and Technology Studies [STS] as an institutional meta-discipline) and the 
anthropology of social sciences, into a ‘monist or a symmetric anthropology’ (the subtitle of 
We Have Never Been Modern, 1991) ‘abandoning simultaneously the use of Nature and the 
use of Society’ (Latour, 2005: 93, 109).21 What is at stake here is a radical deconstruction of 
the structural divides of modernity (in there/out there). While invoking the general dispositif 
of Anti-Œdipus,22 it works from the ‘circulation of transformations’ (Latour, 1999: 22) 
deploying each ‘thing’ as a multiple through local effects of absolute concreteness in a non-
modern (but not a postmodern) situation. It is this pluriverse, to use William James 
expression, that is to be defined ontologically as a unique plane of immanence animated by a 
chiasmatic double movement: ‘the more we have “socialized” so to speak “outside” nature, 
the more “outside” objectivity the content of our subjectivity can gain’ (Latour, 1999: 23). 
This double movement mediating ANT transdisciplinarity ungrounds (effonde) Western 
metaphysics – from the Aristotelo-Thomist substantia to the transcendantal subject – to 
determine a politics of collectives which would allow political relevance stricto sensu to be 
redefined within a ‘relocation of the extraordinary originality of political circulation’ (Latour, 
1999: 23). With reference to Isabelle Stengers’ Cosmopolitics, and the way she affirms the 
ecology of practices as political apprenticeship and speculative thought, in a very para-
Guattarian movement, Latour concludes his article by referring to the political perspective 
that is supposed to take place After (après/d’après) ANT, as the major task of a ‘collective 
philosophy’.  
It is interesting to notice that a bit later, in Reassembling the Social (2005), Latour will 
kindly ‘apologize’ for his former critical position about ANT (‘four nails in a coffin’) and will 
                                                 
21
 This is to say that both sociology and anthropology are experimentally hyper-problematized in their passage to 
ANT. 
22
 Latour refers frequently to the importance of his reading of Anti-Œdipus. To see it at work in a key-text of 
ANT literature, see Callon and Latour, 1981: 302, n. 9. 
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resuscitate the acronym (a perfect ‘trail sniffing and collective traveller’: ‘an ant writing for 
other ants, this fits my project very well’) from the distinction between the ‘sociology of the 
social’ and the ‘sociology of associations’ (or associology), reciprocally and historically 
referring to the quarrel between Durkheim and Tarde. Because 'he does not respect any border 
between nature and society, and because he does not stop at the borders between physics, 
biology and sociology' (Latour, 2002: 4), Gabriel Tarde and his neo-monadology is 
rediscovered as the 'forefather' of ANT in a world made of differences, differential 
associations or collectives, mixing humans and non-humans, a world without which politics, 
as the continuous/discontinuous composition/assembling of one common world, would be 
impossible (Latour, 2005, 250–53). It is this common world that cannot be properly divided in 
readymade disciplinary domains, but only in terms of the different skills, or operations 
applied to one and the ‘same domain’ (Latour, 2005, 254); a domain that in turn cannot exist 
without its associations with all the other domains that make the former escape from the 
regular mechanisms it institutes and constitutes. Collectively translated and redesigned, the 
‘magic formula’ PLURALISM=MONISM presents itself as a kind of politics of 
transdisciplinarity in which each discipline, while extending and testing the entities it 
mobilizes, enters into an inter-problematization of the modes of assembling its assemblages, 
liberated from the modern meta-language of the epistemological bifurcation Human/Non-
human, or, more classically, Nature/Culture (or Nature/Knowledge, following Whitehead's 
deconstruction of 'the bifurcation of nature').  
Transdisciplinary ecologization versus disciplinary modernization: this is the crossing 
zone Latour and Guattari may share in the un/common emergency of a hybrid political 
ontology, denouncing the division between primary (objective) and secondary (subjective) 
qualities as the forclosure of an ontological politics redefined by 'the progressive composition 
of a common world'.
23
  
This rough schematization had no other goal than the tracing of associations (to the 
detriment of the differences) with the Deleuzo-Guattarian rhizome to better suggest a 
provisional framework from within which it would be possible to apprehend, by contrast, the 
                                                 
23
 Cf. Latour, 2004: 47: 'we notice that the division between primary and secondary qualities has already done 
the bulk of the political work'. The term 'ontological politics' does not come from Latour but from John Law. It 
has been used further by Annemarie Mol (Mol, 1999). The most Guattarian resonances in Latour's corpus can be 
found in Irréductions (1984), which has been retrospectively considered the first conceptual manifesto of Actor-
Network Theory. Cf. Latour, 1984 and 1988. See in particular 2.4.2, 2.4.4 and 2.4.5, on 'words' in 'things', with 
the subsequent critique of linguistics; 3.2.5, Scolie, for the non-separation of the forces in human/non-human, 
and the final proposition of the term 'unconscious': 'if you were sufficiently open-minded to designate things-in-
themselves with it'; 3.3.3.2, on the non-separation of the technical and the social in 'machines’. 
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‘categorial diplomatic’ turn of An Inquiry into Modes of Existence (2012).24 If it envelops 
politics in a positive anthropology of the Moderns, it is in the agora — supported by a Web 
2.0 participative dispositif, building upon the possibility afforded by technological networks 
to 'follow up interactions in a detailed way'
25
 — that the ontological categorization of the 
experience of the values related to the plurality of the modes of existence, which are not taken 
into account by networks, is supposedly developed. At this point, we can grasp the very 
different meaning of this ‘After’ Actor-Network Theory, since the Network is no longer the 
(processual machination of) Being but one mode of existence among many others, one that 
will be criticized because of its non-diplomatic monotony. Monotony in ‘saying almost the 
same thing about all [the domains/disciplines]: namely, that they are “composed in a 
heterogeneous fashion of unexpected elements revealed by the investigation”’ (Latour, 2013a: 
35).
26
 For having ‘retained some of the limitations of critical thought’ (Latour, 2013a: 64) and 
being exclusively focused on the 'relations of forces' (Latour, 1984: 12),
27
 the network is 
regressing to the expression of a phenomenal empiricism, and seems to loose the ontological-
rhizomatic plane of immanence that, for Deleuze and Guattari, not only had to be ‘followed’ 
but always had to be constructed in complex semio-machinic processes of production of 
specific multiplicities, constantly addressing the capitalistic 
deterritorialization/reterritorialization machinery as its constitutive field of forces. Although it 
is not without possible analogies with the passage from A Thousand Plateaus to What is 
Philosophy?, the terrain of the Inquiry is nevertheless very different (and very different from 
its Guattarian chaosmotic reinvestment). The question becomes that of the heterogenetic 
reconstruction (or the ‘ontological history’) of the disciplines, given their dependence on the 
metaphysical categorization of  ‘values’ (associated with the prepositions commanding each 
mode of existence) and their transdisciplinary crossings in a purely 'regional ontology'. 
Latour’s formulations, ‘are supposed to allow each mode to enter into resonance with all the 
                                                 
24
 Regarding the rhizome, Michel Serres is an important intercessor with his texts (from the Hermes series) on 
the network and his concept of translation, put to work in ANT as a 'Sociology of Translation'. (See Michel 
Callon, 1986). Following Deleuze, Latour frequently refers the rhizome to Tarde’s Monadology and Sociology 
(Tarde, 1999). The original protocol of the ‘categorial diplomatic’ turn may be found in Latour’s Politics of 
Nature (1999), with its final call to the 'diplomat' and an 'ecological diplomacy' largely influenced by Isabelle 
Stengers' Cosmopolitics. 
25
 Latour, 2002: 2, n. 2. This is why, to Latour, the internet ultimately seems 'such a Tardian technology' (11, n. 
15). For a more detailed profile, see Latour, 2013b. The imposing AIME dispositive can be accessed on 
http://www.modesofexistence.org/. 
26
 Following Latour himself, this would be the ‘complete contradiction’ haunting his metaphysical treatise 
Irréductions: 'it claimed to use the same metalanguage, in terms of translation, networks, and entelechies for all 
associations.'  Latour, 2013b: 12–13. 
27
 These introductory pages have been substantially modified in the English edition (Latour, 1988). This question 
of force defines the plane of consistency of Irréductions: 'there is nothing more than relations of forces 
(épreuves de forces)' – bizarrely translated as 'trials of weakness'. Latour, 1984: 213; 1988: 191.  
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others, but also to be differentiated from the institution that has often betrayed it, as well as 
from the domain that encloses it’ (Latour, 2013a: 480). The disciplines are after all destined to 
be diplomatically renegotiated, to redefine the Moderns but with a chance to gain their 
agreement, since we are taking into account ‘what they cherish’:28 a positive and respectful 
anthropology of the moderns.
29
 If multiplicities have to be made in the making (compare the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian formula: le multiple, il faut le faire), they have to be redirected towards 
this new figure of universality (l’universel, il faut le faire)30 that activates and mobilizes the 
diplomat in his hope for a common world in the postnatural/postcultural age of ‘Gaia’.  (It 
would be extremely interesting to compare the Latourian diplomat with Stengers’ first model 
of the diplomat at the end of Cosmopolitics, which opens with the will 'to diagnose new 
immanent modes of existence'.)
31
  
Gaïa, or the truly other Other, becomes the support for a philosophical anthropology of 
Being-as-Other that, through its ontological pluralism, mediates the possible pacific 
coexistence of modes of existence, from the open space between the value of experiences, the 
diverging modes of valorisations of Being, and the institutional translations/reductions of their 
proper transcendences. But the fact that Gaia – or the incarnation of the Monism of the Other 
in the Inquiry – being the mode of existence sui generis and the ‘mix up of all the mix ups’, is 
neither a mode of existence like the ‘others’, nor properly analysed with regard to the 
ontologico-political recompositions required by its ‘anthropocenic’ insistence and its 
incompatibility with capitalistic logic,
32
 may encourage a practical-metaphysical — and 
perhaps vaguely scholastic — reading of this new philosophy of mediation, compensating 
Gaia's original religious Stimmung
33
.  
One cannot deny the fantastic transdisciplinary redistributions operated by a new image of 
thought where — as Patrice Maniglier puts it — ‘psychology becomes a kind of sorcery, 
language a sort of fiction (and not conversely), technology something that long precedes 
humanity and so on’ (Maniglier, 2014: 41). Nevertheless, transdisciplinarity as such is less 
                                                 
28
 Cf. Latour’s autocritique concerning the Science Wars of the 1980s in contrast with the methodological 
statement at the beginning of Les Microbes: 'expliquer la science des pasteuriens, c'est n'utiliser pour en rendre 
compte aucun des termes de la tribu' (my emphasis). [‘In other words, to explain the science of the Pasteurians,  
we must describe it without resorting to any of the terms of the tribe.’] Latour, 1984: 13; Latour, 1988: 8-9.. 
29
 'Is respect not the ultimate value of the anthropological project?', Latour asks in a recent article. Latour, 2009: 
473. 
30
 Cf. Latour, 2012b: 955.  
31
 Stengers quotes Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy?: ‘To diagnose the becomings in each present…' 
Stengers, 1997a: 23–4. The function of the diplomat is developed in Vol. 7, Chapters 7–10 (Stengers, 1997b). 
32
 In contrast with Latour's distrust of the term 'capitalism', Stengers has never stopped referring to its 'logic'. See 
Stengers, 2013. 
33
 Against which Latour, in the present volume, below, restates Gaïa as a 'scientific concept'. (Latour, 2015.) 
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constructively problematized After ANT, as the ‘speculative question of an ecology of 
practices’ (Stengers, 1997b: 119), than openly mediated by a very institutional political play, 
inseparable from its own putting into form (mise en forme).
34
 So that the 'sovereign' tension 
between the 'experimental metaphysics' claimed by the Inquiry and the reality principle of a 
new kind of 'institutional analysis' (to use the Guattarian appellation, transformed here into an 
ironic mode) makes all its actuality.  
 
This article is an output from the AHRC funded project 'Transdisciplinarity and the 
Humanities' (AH/I004378/1) 
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